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Abstract
Inequality in wealth is a pressing concern in many contempo-
rary societies, where it has been show to co-occur with polit-
ical polarization and policy volatility, however its causes are
unclear. Here we demonstrate in a simple model where social
behavior spreads through learning that inequality can covary
reliably with other cooperative behavior, despite a lack of ex-
ogenous cause or deliberate coordination. In the context of
simulated cultural evolution selecting for trust and cooperative
exchange, we find both cooperation and inequality to be more
prevalent in contexts where the same agents play both the roles
of the trusting investor and the trusted investee, in contrast to
the condition where these roles are divided between disjoint
populations. Cooperation is more likely in contexts of high
transparency about potential partners and with a high amount
of partner choice; while inequality is more likely with high
information but no choice in partners for those that want to in-
vest. While not yet a full model of contemporary society, our
approach holds promise for examining the causality and social
contexts underlying shifts in income inequality.
Keywords: trust; cooperation; inequality; behavioral ecology;
agent-based modeling; social learning; cultural evolution
Introduction
Wealth inequality is an issue of considerable social concern.
Striking the appropriate balance between egalitarian and mer-
itocratic (for various definitions of merit) distributions of
wealth and power has been a dominant political concern since
at least the time of Marx (1867). In recent decades, the world
as a whole has seen wealth inequality decrease, concomi-
tant with a substantial drop in extreme poverty (Olinto et al.,
2013). However in the wealthy countries of the OECD, in-
equality has been increasing. The present increase in inequal-
ity has sometimes been attributed to information technology,
particularly artificial intelligence (Brynjolfsson & McAfee,
2014; Ford, 2015, for reviews). Although some argue that in-
equality per se is not so much of a concern as the wealth of
a society’s poorest members, others argue that radical differ-
ences in income lead to a lack of shared identity and political
disenfranchisement (Plato, 380BC; Atkinson, 2015). While
the causality is not yet established, there is good evidence that
greater inequality increases political polarization (McCarty &
Shor, 2016), leads to political volatility (Dutt & Mitra, 2008),
and damages economic growth (Ostry et al., 2014). Establish-
ing causal connections between these correlates is not only of
scientific interest, but would have substantial consequences
for public policy. However, establishing causality via inter-
ventions is both costly and potentially ethically problematic.
Here we propose that our understanding of the causes and
consequences of inequality may be advanced if we leverage
the more widely explored models of the dynamics of cooper-
ative behavior. Cooperation is now understood to be as funda-
mental a biological behavior as competition (Marshall, 2015).
Cooperation is a strategy by which ‘selfish’ genes can propa-
gate themselves, as one vector of their transmission may pay
a cost to increase the probability that other vectors survive
and flourish. In some circumstances, such strategies gener-
ate absolute increases in overall advantage for a collection of
cooperators; however, in all circumstances at least some indi-
viduals must focus sufficiently on their own survival to per-
sist. Consequently, increasing and decreasing social invest-
ment may be an appropriate response to changing contexts
(MacLean et al., 2010; Bryson et al., 2014); though oscilla-
tions in the dominance of social vs. independent strategies
have also been shown to emerge without an exogenous envi-
ronmental cause (Cavaliere et al., 2012).
The work presented here demonstrates that levels of in-
equality can also vary and emerge with no environmental trig-
ger and no change discrete change in policy. We extend here
a previous account of trust and cooperation in human eco-
nomic transactions. This previous account used an evolution-
ary model to demonstrate two human-like behaviors: blind
trust in unfamiliar strangers, and the costly rejection of unfair
but profitable offers. Here we replicate and extend that model
in the context of social learning rather than biological evolu-
tion. We also show that the results hold in a more biologically
plausible spatial context (where interactions are only with
neighbors), then examine the dynamics of inequality under
both conditions. We find persistent inequality emerging only
in limited circumstances, but transient inequality emerging as
part of periodic collapses in cooperative behavior. These are
transient because the context of trust required fades until the
behaviors resulting in inequality are again suppressed.
Background and Previous Work
The Trust Game
In this paper we explore the dynamics of trust, exchange, and
inequality in the context of an established model from the be-
havioral economics literature: the trust game. The trust game
has two players playing anonymously, and an experimenter
mediating their cooperation. The first player, the investor, is
given money by the experimenter, then offered the option of
keeping the money, or entrusting it to an anonymous other:
the investee. Both players know that the experimenter will
not simply give the money to the investee, but also multiply
it by a factor b. The investee can now keep all the money, or
give any amount of it back to investor. In the present paper,
we focus on one-shot games, where this is the sum total of
all interactions between the two anonymous players. In such
a context, there is no obvious motivation for the investee to
return any money, but generally they do. Similarly, there is
no reason for the investor to have blind faith in this return,
but many do make the investment, though often that trust is
misplaced (Berg et al., 1995; Gu¨th et al., 1997).
Rauwolf & Bryson (2016) demonstrate that evolutionary
pressure can be maintained for trusting in this game in some
contexts, as described below. This work extends from that
of a number of other theoreticians, who have been exploring
whether experimentally-observed levels of trust might be ex-
plained if we assumed that investors have either knowledge
of the investee’s rate of return due to reputation, or at least a
population-level expectation based on experience of behavior
such as might be captured by evolution (Bear & Rand, 2016).
Manapat et al. (2012) have shown that selective pressure for
trust can arise when there is sufficient chance of knowing a
trustee’s return rate. This is true even when information is
delayed and inconsistent (Manapat & Rand, 2012).
Tarnita (2015) has similarly shown trust should emerge in
this context, however she also exploits the mechanism of a
structured environment: that is, that interactions are more
likely to occur with some individuals than others. Although
sometimes overlooked in mathematical theory (Sober & Wil-
son, 1998, for a history), in practice it takes time to traverse
physical space, so nearly all interactions between organisms
in the real world have this property. Further, both because
offspring tend to be born near their mothers and bear family
resemblance, and also social species tend to learn behavior
from each other, those nearer to you are more likely to behave
as you do. These properties have been shown to support both
the genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation, and their
ubiquity may explain the similar ubiquity of cooperation in
nature (Hamilton, 1964; Marshall, 2015).
Experimental researchers have also examined the effects
of offering investors in the Trust Game information about the
trustees’ return rate before they decide whether to invest. In-
vestors often reject offers that would be profitable (r > 1/b),
implying an implicit demand for fairer returns (i.e. ≈ 1/2
Manapat et al., 2012). Rejecting an offer even when it pro-
vides a net gain for the investor again seems irrational and
maladaptive, but here again Rauwolf & Bryson (2016) show
that it can be advantageous. If there is sufficient competition
between potential investees, then a strategy of withholding
benefit from those who offer too little return on investment
can pay off in the long term.
Previous Work: Methods and Results
Rauwolf & Bryson (2016) use an evolutionary agent-based
model to determine whether it might be adaptive to blindly
trust someone whose rate of return is unknown, even prefer-
ring them to someone who has offered a rate that is beneficial
but unfair. We do this in a context of partner choice. We
assume that on any given round of the game, a trustee may
interact with only a subset of the population. The number of
potential partners (k) ranges from 1–5. The other independent
variable in the experiment is the probability of knowing (q)
the the return rate (r) of any one partner. Return rates are the
sole adaptive feature of the population of investees. The pop-
ulation of investors have two adaptive characteristics: their
probability of preferring to trust a stranger (t) over keeping
their money to themselves when there is no available partner
with a known suitable r, and the level of r they demand (d)
before entering a game with a player with known r.
Throughout this paper, the benefit of investing b is set to
3, so the investee always receives triple the money invested.
We also focus on the binary version of the game: the options
available to the investor are only all or nothing (as per Gu¨th
et al., 1997). The decision rule of the investor therefore is
the following: An investor knows r for j out of k potential
partner trustees, where j/k = q, the probability of knowing r.
An investor invests with trustee i who has return rate ri with
probability:
p(ri) =

1 i≤ j; max
1≤x≤ j
rx = ri ≥ d
0 i≤ j; max
1≤x≤ j
rx 6= ri
t
k− j i > j; max1≤x≤ j
rx < d
(1)
An entrusted trustee deterministically returns the investment
×br to the investor, and keeps b(1− r).
A population is initially seeded with random values of r,d
and t drawn from the range [0,1]. The entire population is
born simultaneously, and all live for 500 rounds. There are
500 agents of each type. Each round every investor is of-
fered the opportunity to invest with one of k randomly se-
lected trustees. After 500 rounds, a new generation of in-
vestors and trustees are selected, with the probability of a set
of variables persisting into the next generation being directly
correlated to an agents’ wealth. In line with Manapat et al.
(2012), each agent is selected for the next generation using
the pairwise comparison process. When an attribute is added
to the next generation it is slightly mutated over a Gaussian
distribution with µ= 0 and σ= 0.01. After 1000 generations,
we observed the populations’ averages for the three depen-
dent variables (traits.) We found that the rate of return tended
to depend on both information and competition between part-
ners. Nearly all the investment is returned under conditions
where all return values are known (q≈ 1) and there are many
partners (k ≈ 5), whereas return rates approached 0 as q did,
or when k = 1. In contrast, trust and demand peaked not at
the extreme limits of the parameter space, but at intermediate
values. Trust was only selected for in contexts of partial infor-
mation, and came to very high levels when both 0.2< q< 0.7
and 2≤ k≤ 5. For higher levels of q, trust drifts neutrally be-
cause r is driven high by direct competition. As the number of
partners increases, the maximum information rate q for main-
taining high t declined further, since effectively more part-
ners provide more knowledge of return rate. The shape of the
curve for demand was similar, although demand was always
in the range 0.333 < d < 0.6. The floor is set by b; any return
lower than b means investments lose money. Again, where r
was driven high by competition (high q), or where there is no
information (low q), d drifts unused. Selection for the costly
rejection of partners only occurred in the same situations as
trust.
Methods: Replication and Extensions
We have produced a new ABM to replicate and extend our
previous results. In the present paper, we wished to examine
four further questions:
1. Do the results hold for social learning? Here we as-
sumed a stable but not particularly cognitive population
that learned socially, rather than evolved. Rather than
learning from its own experience (which may be useless
in a constantly shifting environment) the agents learn from
each other. After each round of the game, agents copy the
parameters of their potential trading partners if those part-
ners have more money than they do.
2. Does spatial structure alter the results? We added loca-
tion in an x,y grid as a parameter of the agents. In the
spatial, local condition, partners were drawn from adjacent
neighbors. We also ran a condition without spatial struc-
ture to confirm the replication. As reviewed above, space
is expected to facilitate cooperation, and also diversity.
3. What is the impact of investment castes? Previous models
had investors and investees in disjoint populations. We ran
conditions assuming the same, and alternative conditions
assuming that all individuals could invest, and any individ-
ual might be called upon to be an investee. We expected
the unified population to show greater, more stable cooper-
ation due to mutualism, as per Estrela et al. (2015).
4. In what conditions if any will inequality emerge, and will it
be stable? This was our principle motivation for this study.
We anticipated that extremely high rates of return (r) or
demand (d) might generate inequality.
Simulations were run in NetLogo on a 33x33 grid, so with
1089 locations, each with one either a single agent, or in the
situation where investors and investees were different castes,
two agents, but these agents did not interact. The environment
provided each agent with one unit of currency per round. The
agents invested all of their wealth if they chose to invest,
so the results could be cumulative; however this rapidly ex-
ceeded the arithmetic capacity of NetLogo, so all agents were
also taxed at a flat rate every round. For spatial models, the
world was assumed to be toroidal, so all agents had 8 neigh-
bors, of which k would be drawn randomly on each round as
potential investees.
Results
Our results show the following:
1. The dynamics of learning are very much like the dynam-
ics of evolution—the outcomes are certainly comparable.
This is assuming that social learning occurs implicitly or
at least automatically. Fig. 1, row 1 replicates Rauwolf &
Bryson (2016) most closely in both experimental condition
and outcome.
2. Spatial assortment also had surprisingly little impact
(Fig. 1, top two rows vs. bottom two).
3. The most striking result of our replication was the dif-
ference between a unified population of investors and in-
vestees (rows 2 and 4 of Fig. 1) vs. the original disjoint
castes (rows 1 and 3). The unified population had a far
greater range of values for which the return rate r was high.
This result also clarified the contexts affording high levels
of demand. Where there is high information (q), r is driven
by pure competition and demand (d) drifts sufficiently low
that it has not impact. When the populations are separate,
for low q, r collapses and d again has no impact. But in the
case where the traits are bound in a single population, there
is sufficient selective pressure on d to keep costly punish-
ment high even under low information. Interestingly, trust
(t) and d seem to complement each other at least when r is
sufficiently high to merit trust.
4. The only conditions that afforded substantial inequality
were those with the single population (Fig. 2). The top
1% of the population ordinarily had between 1–1.5% of the
wealth at least among the investors, although the investee-
only caste suffered greater differentiation where there was
either high information and no choice or low (but not zero)
information and choice. But the greatest inequality, where
the top 1% of the population had as much as 50% of the
wealth, occurred only when investors and investees were
the same individuals, and then only in conditions of high
information (q > 0.5) and no partner choice (k = 1).
5. In the conditions best replicating human performance on
the trust game, inequality surges periodically correlated
with a drop in return rate. There is no stable equilibrium
for cooperation in any of these models, but rather the dy-
namics are such that cooperation periodically erodes but
then recovers. In our model, inequality was a characteris-
tic result of these periods of collapse (Figure 3).
Discussion and Future Work
There is a growing body of evidence has shown that inequal-
ity and polarization have tracked each other closely in the
USA since at least the 1880s, well before the onset of IT or
Figure 1: Trust, rate of return, and demand for the four conditions. The top two rows partners are randomly selected from the
full population, the bottom two rows they are only selected from adjacent neighbors. The top and third row the populations
of investors and investees are disjoint, the second and bottom row all agents play both roles. Values represent averages over
N = 1089 agents for the final 300 time cycles (of 1200), for each of 5 runs. Note that index colors do not indicate consistent
ranges, but rather vary by subfigure—see keys for values. See main text for interpretation.
(a) investor caste, global partners (b) investor caste, local partners (c) investees, local partners (global similar)
(d) global partners, unified population (e) local partners, unified population
Figure 2: Inequality as measured by the proportion of wealth held by the top 1% of investors for each of the four conditions;
values averaged as per Figure 1. Note that index color ranges are not consistent across subfigures, see keys. The only condition
of extreme inequality occurs when investors and investees are drawn from the same population, there is no partner choice
(although agents can still refuse to invest at all), and relatively high levels of information are available about potential investees.
Note that localised investment reduces the required level of information to generate inequality.
AI. Both inequality and political polarization peaked imme-
diately before and after World War I, then plummeted dur-
ing the Great Depression (McCarty & Shor, 2016). Though
now viewed as a norm, the long flat trough of both inequality
and polarization between WWII and the 1980s may actually
be the aberration, as ordinary oscillations in altruism such as
were described by Cavaliere et al. (2012) were held in check
by financial policy (Bryson & McCarty, 2016).
The results shown here are preliminary, but open the way
to time-series analysis which may afford a better understand-
ing of causality in this model, which can then be checked
for match to the existing political and economic data. Cer-
tainly the dynamics of these models fluctuate greatly: there
is no stable equilibrium, but rather tendencies for cooperation
which occasionally are compromised for local profit. Cre-
ating better correlation to human society will probably also
require modeling the stickiness of institutions.
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